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Abstract 
If the demand under price dispersion is formed by consumers with zero search costs and 
consumers with positive search costs, the law of one price holds at the equilibrium price level, 
where the lowest willingness to pay between consumers with zero search costs meets the 
willingness to accept or to sell of consumers with positive search costs. Consumers with positive 
search costs maximize their utility with respect to their optimal decisions when marginal losses 
in labor income during the search are equal to marginal savings on purchase. Optimal decisions 
move their willingness to accept to the equilibrium price level. Suboptimal decisions of 
consumers with positive search costs result in willingness to accept below the lowest willingness 
to pay of consumers with zero search costs and arbitrage takes place. Arbitrage drops down the 
equilibrium price to the level where willingness to accept of consumers with positive search 
costs meets the new lowest willingness to pay of consumers with zero search costs and where 
purchasing decisions of consumers with positive search costs become optimal.  
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Introduction 
During last decades the problem of price dispersion has become one of the most intriguing issues 
of modern economics (Adams (1997), Burdett and Judd (1983), Carlson and McAfee (1983), 
Diamond (1971, 1987), Fishman (1992), Janssen and Moraga-González (2004), Janssen, 
Moraga-González, and Wildenbeest (2005), Lach (2002), Manning (1997), Pratt, Wise, and 
Zeckhauser (1979), Reinsdorf (1994), Rosenthal (1980), Rothschild (1974), Salop and Stiglitz 
(1977,1982), Stahl (1989), Stigler (1961), Stiglitz (1979), Varian (1980)). In 1994 J.McMillan 
and M.Rothschild summarized the growing interest to the question of price dispersion in the 
“Handbook of Game Theory”. In 2006 M.R.Baye, J.Morgan and P.Scholten presented the 
comprehensive overview of that problem for “Economics and Information Systems” where they 
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introduced that phenomenon with the proposition that empirical studies had revealed the fact that 
price dispersion was the rule rather than the exception in many homogeneous product markets. 
In addition, the authors strengthened their opinion by very famous statement: “Economists have 
belatedly come to recognize that the “law of one price” is no law at all” (Varian 1980,p.651). 
The persistence of price dispersion is supported by consumers’ heterogeneity. Usually analytical 
approaches to consumers’ heterogeneity envisage two groups of consumers. There are 
consumers that do not search, i.e., price-takers, and there are consumers that search for low 
price: “Some consumers have zero search costs, while all others have a positive search cost” 
(Stahl 1989,p.700). The model of the optimal consumption-leisure choice under price dispersion 
(Malakhov 2013,2014a,2014b,2014c,2015) also uses this dual approach. Examining shoppers 
with zero search costs and searchers with positive search costs, the model proposes some 
additional reasoning to the question whether Walras’ law holds or not under price dispersion in 
homogeneous product markets. 
The model of the optimal consumption-leisure choice under price dispersion argues that market 
transforms everyday satisficing buying decisions into optimal consumption-leisure choices that 
equalize marginal costs of search with its marginal benefits. The model describes the analytical 
framework that demonstrates why an explicit satisficing decision becomes optimal. Observing 
behavior of searchers, this paper specifies the role of optimization of search costs in the 
establishment of the equilibrium price level.  
 
Willingness to pay, equilibrium price, and willingness to accept 
The optimal consumer choice under price dispersion represents the result of the trade-off 
between consumption and leisure with respect to two constraints – the wage rate w and marginal 
savings on purchase, i.e., the price reduction with regard to the time of search at the moment of 
purchase ∂P/∂S<0. The trade-off between consumption Q and leisure H is provided by the 
propensity to search ∂L/∂S<0, i.e., the propensity to substitute labor for search as for another 
source of income. When the problem of the maximization of consumption-leisure utility U(Q,H) 
is constrained by the equality of marginal values of search w∂L/∂S=Q∂P/∂S, where the left side 
of the equation represents the value of marginal loss in labor income during the search and the 
right side represents the value of marginal benefit of search, the marginal rate of substitution of 
leisure for consumption takes the following form (Fig.1): 
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Fig.1.Optimal consumption-leisure choice 
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∂U / ∂Q
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w
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∂2L / ∂S∂H (1)  
 
The analysis of the propensity to search discovers the time-based structure of this apparently 
complex psychological variable with respect to the time horizon T=L+S+H of the consumption-
leisure choice (Malakhov 2013,2015): 
w ∂L
∂S
= −w L+ S
T
(2)  
And the derivative of the propensity to search with respect to leisure time simplifies the 
presentation of the MRS(H for Q): 
−
L+ S
T
=
H −T
T
⇒∂2L / ∂S∂H = 1
T
(3)  
∂U / ∂H
∂U / ∂Q
= −
w
T∂P / ∂S
(4)  
And we see that this consideration gives us another form of the constraint for the utility 
maximization problem: 
w ∂L
∂S =Q
∂P
∂S ⇒ w(L + S) = −TQ∂P /∂S (5)  
The static maximization problem simply requires the equality of marginal values of search 
w∂L/∂S=Q∂P/∂S. It tells us that any optimal choice should respect this equality. However, a 
common consumer choice usually represents the result of some dynamic sequential search for 
the predetermined quantity Q along the dispersion of prices that produce different marginal 
savings on purchase ∂P/∂S. And the final decision, for example, the choice of the first quote 
below the reservation level of labor income wL<wL0,  that could be spent and restored after the 
purchase, represents the choice of the price of purchase PP=wL for the given quantity Q with 
corresponding marginal savings Q∂P/∂S. If we follow step by step a common purchasing 
decision, it gives us the following picture (Fig.2): 
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Fig.2. Satisficing optimal decision 
We see the graphical presentation of consumer decision develops Equations 4 and 5. It gives us 
some price P at the zero-search-costs level. And this price is greater than the willingness to pay 
WTP=wL0.  
To understand better this hypothetical price let us take home production, say, preparing a meal, 
as a particular form of search  where the purchase price is equal to the price of inputs for home 
production or meal’s ingredients, or QPp=wL, and costs of production are equal to their 
opportunity costs, or to the wS value. 1 And the value of total costs w(L+S) should give us the 
price of the prepared meal, or w(L+S) =QP. This assumption gives us an understanding that the 
value of our hypothetical price is equal to the willingness to accept or to sell the prepared meal. 
The same thing happens when a consumer decides at what price he should sell the bought item. 
If a consumer decides to sell an item he should recover not only labor costs wL but also search 
costs wS. Hence, the marginal rate of substitution of searcher’s consumption to his leisure takes 
the final form: 
∂U /∂H
∂U /∂Q = −
w
∂P /∂S ∂
2L /∂S∂H = − wT∂P∂S =
w
P (6)  
However, searchers are not willing to pay this price and they start the search with the reservation 
level wL0. Who can pay this price? Obviously, there are consumers that are not interesting in 
search. Really, zero search costs don’t eliminate the propensity to search. Equation (2) simply 
takes the following form: 
w ∂L
∂S = −w
L
T (7)  
                                            
1 The model presented here simplifies the vision of the allocation of time. While it takes into account only labor, 
leisure, and search, the ∂L/∂S<0 rule takes the search as any form of activity that reduces price of purchase. 
However this simplification doesn’t look methodologically inconsistent because even the detailed analysis of the 
allocation of time can assume that “the price of time (is) the same for the shopper and for the home producer” 
(Aguiar and Hurst 2007, p.1536). And that “price of time” here really “does not necessarily equal a market wage 
(ibid.). Being compared with marginal savings on purchase, or µ=Q∂P/∂S, it gives us µ=w∂L/∂S. 
 5 
The search is not interesting for shoppers because at this price level, where all shoppers are still 
price-takers and therefore price-reduction-takers, the search, let’s take for illustrative simplicity 
a single unit purchase, produces absolute marginal savings that are not greater then absolute 
marginal losses in labor income, or: 
−w LT ≥
∂P
∂S (8)  
It means that the zero-search-costs level collects all buyers with willingness to pay higher or 
equal to the price that represents the full attractiveness of an item. However, the inequality of 
marginal values of search is not stable. Shoppers with very high wage rate need less time to 
restore their cash balances and they reduce the expected time-horizon. The cut in the expected 
time horizon by saving in labor time decreases the absolute value of propensity to search (Fig.3): 
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Fig.3.Adjustment of high WTP to equilibrium price level 
wL0 >> P; w
L0
T0
>
∂P
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∂P
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The process of adjustment of time horizon of consumers with different high willingness to pay 
eliminates the inequality of marginal values of search in Equation (8) and all consumers with 
high willingness to pay equalize their marginal losses in labor income with marginal savings at 
this price level: 
waLa = wbLb = ... = wnLn = −T∂P /∂S = Pe (10)  
However, when the value of price reduction is given, we see that at this price level market 
adjusts different perceptions of time horizons and makes itself really homogenous with the 
unique time horizon. 
This is the level of equilibrium price. If we do not take into account for the moment the existence 
of upper price niche where consumers with high willingness to pay, suffering from the “snob 
effect” at the equilibrium price level, can search and make ambitious purchases, we can say that 
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the equilibrium price level is equal to the lowest willingness to pay between high-income 
consumers with zero search costs. 
For the moment, these considerations follow the assumption that “the price in the high-price 
stores is the reservation price of shoppers with high willingness to pay, not their maximum 
willingness to pay for the good” (Diamond 1987, p.434). However, the possibility to adjust time 
horizon attracts to this price level or to the high-price store also some low-income consumers. 
Impatient low-income consumers can compensate at this price level the low wage rate by high 
propensity to search that results in earlier and more intensive consumption. The acceleration of 
consumption changes the time horizon. And impatient low-income consumers should accept not 
only the equilibrium price but also the equilibrium time horizon, which is shorter than the time 
horizon of their easy-going low-income neighbors. The reduction in the time horizon transforms 
the initial inequality of marginal values of search that encourages easy-going low-income 
consumers to search, into the optimal equation for their impatient low-income neighbors that 
eliminates the need to look or to wait for low price: 
 
w ∂L
∂S <
∂P
∂S ;−w
L
T0
<
∂P
∂S ;T1 < T0;−w
L
T1
=
∂P
∂S (11)  
In fact, the famous example of tourists, looking for a restaurant (Salop and Stiglitz 1977), can be 
revised under this assumption of impatience. Even low-income tourists don’t want to waste time, 
they choose the restaurant for a lunch on their way, and in the evening they become hungry 
earlier and they are ready to take a dinner.  
Generally, low-income consumers do not accept the equilibrium price level, which is appropriate 
for their high-income or low-income impatient neighbors. Easy-going low-income consumers 
can take an advantage of their low wage rates and low propensity to search with respect to great 
marginal savings produced by the equilibrium price level. Searchers begin to look for low prices 
with regard to their willingness to pay. Of course, they esteem the total aller-et-retour time of 
search, i.e. the time to get in and out. Some of them search in out-of-town commercial centers 
and some of them at factories’ outlets where purchase prices Pp are really different (Pa, Pb…Pn). 
However, wherever they make purchases their willingness to accept comes to the equilibrium 
price level (Fig.4), or: 
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Fig.4. Equilibrium price, purchase prices, and WTA of heterogeneous searchers 
wa (La + Sa ) = −Ta∂Pa /∂Sa = wb(Lb + Sb ) = −Tb∂Pb /∂Sb = ... = wn (Ln + Sn ) = −Tn∂Pn /∂Sn = Pe (12)  
What happens when price dispersion is distorted and some prices don’t result in corresponding 
marginal savings? This is the same thing that takes place when satisficing decision seems to be 
suboptimal. Generally, searchers begin to look for low prices when the search is interesting, or 
the marginal loss in labor income is less than the marginal saving: 
w ∂L
∂S <
∂P
∂S (13)  
Let us suppose that the satisficing choice of the first quote below the reservation level 
(∂2L/∂S2<0) stays suboptimal in accordance with Equation (13). However, if it is suboptimal, the 
searchers’ willingness to accept or to sell stays below the equilibrium price level, more 
definitely, below the lowest zero-search-costs willingness to pay (Fig.5), or: 
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Fig.5. Resale of suboptimal purchase 
w ∂L
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L + S
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∂P
∂S = Pe (14)  
If it happens, searchers will sell their purchases to shoppers. This extra supply drops the 
equilibrium zero-search-costs price level down to the level where arbitrage becomes unprofitable 
for searchers, i.e., to the level where they equalize marginal values of search, and to its turn this 
equality matches their willingness to accept with a new equilibrium price. In addition, this new 
equilibrium price level reinforces the team of shoppers by newcomers from lower income 
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bracket of searchers that makes the high-price store noisy and the equilibrium price level really 
becomes intolerable for snobs among shoppers.  
The same effect takes place when a searcher finds an unexpected great discount, which results in 
unexpected low price. And, facing Equation (13), either the searcher adjusts the time horizon of 
his choice according to Equation (11), for example, due to shorten shelf-life of a product 
(Malakhov 2014a), or he makes an arbitrage. Adjustments of time horizon, i.e., decision to cut or 
to extend products’ lifecycles at the moment of purchase reduce possibilities of arbitrage.2 It 
means that we can expect resale to be a common economic phenomenon in markets with fixed 
time horizons where adjustments are not possible. And it really takes place in markets of tickets 
for events (Courty 2003). 
Hence, arbitrage and adjustment of time horizon transform suboptimal decisions of searchers 
into satisficing optimal choices. Finally, the equilibrium price level collects different willingness 
to accept of searchers with different wage rates and different propensities to search.  
Thus, the equilibrium price is equal to the willingness to accept of searchers, which is equal to 
the lowest willingness to pay of shoppers with zero search costs and where all individuals 
equalize their marginal losses in labor income with their marginal savings on purchases.  
This assumption takes us back to the classical optimal consumption-leisure choice: 
∂U /∂H
∂U /∂Q = −
w
∂P /∂S ∂
2L /∂S∂H = − wT∂P /∂S =
w
w(L + S) =
w
Pe
(15)  
 
We see, that slight modifications in Stigler’s revolutionary equation do not change the general 
economic sense of exchange. The detailed answer to the question, whether sellers agree with that 
conclusion or not, stays beyond the scope of this paper but it might be framed by some 
comments. 
In the model presented here sellers meet very different willingness to pay. They try to 
discriminate shoppers and to propose additional services to consumers with very high 
willingness to pay that could suffer from the “snob effect” at the equilibrium price level in order 
to separate them. The discrimination might be explicit when sales are made on high streets where 
consumers get a positive externality of prestige purchases, or implicit, like it happens in web 
‘clearinghouses’ where a set of different prices does not exhibit the total sellers’ heterogeneity. 
However, searchers can adjust their propensity to search to different quotes when they 
reconsider time horizons of their purchases with regard to seller’s reputation, post-purchase 
services, etc. When this uncertainty begins to worry shoppers they become searchers. They 
                                            
2 The analysis of the increase in the time horizon with the increase in quantity to be purchased when the quote is 
dissatisfying is presented in Malakhov (2014b). 
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either begin to investigate seller’s reputation, or they look for a new market with more 
guarantees. The appearance of stable upper price niche, i.e., the organization of a new market, 
does not change the logic of consumers’ decision-making. The search model presented here 
slightly decorates a Walrasian market. The stable upper price niche can be considered as a new 
market if there a new group of zero-search-costs consumers emerges. If such a group appears, 
other consumers with high willingness to pay become searchers and they either make satisficing 
optimal purchases when they search for prestigious items, or their purchases are suboptimal and 
these new searchers immediately find some shopper who can buy at zero search costs an item 
that has been already found and bought. And numerous web sites for resale of luxuries 
demonstrate that it is possible. If such a group does not appear, all consumers with high 
willingness to pay can make resale only at the original equilibrium price level and a consumer 
who has overpaid for an item can sell it only with a loss at this level to other zero-search-costs 
consumers.3 
The sellers’ tactics in front of searchers is definitely artless – they redistribute transaction costs 
in order to charge consumers’ costs of search, especially when search entails travel costs. The 
idea to sell for searchers at the equilibrium price level, like it is presumed by the Diamond’s 
Paradox, is not fruitful even if sellers have a monopoly power to reinforce consumers to pay a 
monopoly price. Thus, producers incorporate all transaction costs and they sell at the zero-
search-costs level in the high-price store. If searchers should buy at this equilibrium price, they 
will bring to labor market all time of search. This extra labor supply decreases wage rates and 
makes the equilibrium price level unattainable. Hence sellers also stay heterogeneous. And 
information clearinghouses, newspapers and web sites, “discount” different terms of sale to some 
list of price quotes. In practice, readers see only the vertical axis of Fig.4., where the price 
dispersion is evident and stable. In addition, some sellers can also expose their attempts to 
discriminate shoppers and they set prices above the equilibrium price level. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of propensity to search that optimizes satisficing purchasing decisions shows that 
the “law of one price’ holds in an imperfect homogenous market if there are consumers with zero 
search costs. These consumers have different willingness to pay but they make purchases at the 
level of the lowest zero-search-costs willingness to pay. Consumers with positive search costs 
are also heterogeneous but they have the same willingness to accept or to sell that matches the 
                                            
3 The satisficing purchases are made within the “common model” of behavior even on markets of luxuries. This is 
not true for the “leisure model” of behavior that produces Veblen effect (Malakhov 2015) 
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lowest willingness to pay of consumers with zero search costs at the equilibrium price level. 
Arbitrage adjusts not only prices but also the propensity to search that equalizes marginal losses 
in labor income during the search with marginal savings on purchase on a new equilibrium price 
level. When purchase decisions of consumers with positive search costs are optimal arbitrage 
doesn’t take place. 
The equilibrium price level does not eliminate price dispersion. Consumers have different 
willingness to pay that meet heterogeneous sellers. Sellers try to discriminate consumers and, if 
they find a zero-search-costs demand, the new market is organized.   
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